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Abstract
One of the glaring gaps in Canada’s universal healthcare system is the low level of public financing of 
prescription drugs - 42.7% of total spending in 2018. At the federal level there is renewed interest in moving 
towards universal coverage, supported by a recently commissioned report on how to achieve it. It will take 
superb political navigation to extract Canadian pharmaceutical policy and practice from the grasp of interests 
that profit handsomely from the status quo. This perspective suggests the conditions under which a genuinely 
fair, effective, and efficient pharmacare plan can emerge.
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In World War I over 66 000 Canadians died in the killing fields of Europe. In 1980 the Canadian embassy in Iran executed a daring strategy to smuggle eight at-risk 
diplomats out of the country. In 2005 Canada became the 
fourth country, and the first outside of Europe, to legalize 
same-sex marriage. In 2018 Canada resettled more refugees 
than any country in the world.1 The 2019 US News and World 
Report country rankings place Canada 3rd overall and #1 for 
quality of life.2 It is an admired nation,3 generous and tolerant, 
an oasis of openness and multiculturalism thus far largely 
resistant to the toxic nativisms on the rise elsewhere. Canada 
has done hard things few other countries have managed to 
do. Yet it has not done what many other countries have done 
easily. Exhibit One is universal pharmacare. 
Pharmacare is medicare’s Achilles heel and unfinished 
business, Canada’s Sagrada Familia cathedral, its cornerstone 
laid in Barcelona in 1882 and still undone. In 2018 only 
42.7% of prescription drug expenditures were publicly 
financed.4 The political reasons for the absence of progress 
towards pharmacare are varied and complex, and for reasons 
of space cannot be recounted here.5,6 Suffice it to say that 
no government, provincial or federal, has won office by 
promising it and none has been defeated because it has not. 
The rationale in favour is rock solid, as it has always been.7 
At least 3 million Canadians do not get essential medicines. 
(They are politically powerless, too busy deciding between 
groceries and drugs to mobilize.) New Zealand, with fewer 
people than British Columbia, pays far less for both patented 
and generic drugs than Canada.8 For patented medicines 
Canada has historically outsourced its bargaining, accepting 
the median price among seven comparator countries (to be 
expanded to 11 in 2020). Per capita spending on drugs is 43% 
higher than the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) average.9 Yet for all these stains on the 
national honour, he absence of universal pharmacare has for 
the most part occasioned no more than a periodic we-really-
ought-to-get-to-that conversation while the port is poured 
and the cigars lit.
The injustice is troubling, but the hypocrisy is worse. The 
governments that have rejected universal public coverage 
provide it for their own employees in the form of extended 
health benefit plans. Millions of vulnerable citizens – the 
non-unionized working poor, the not quite indigent elderly, 
struggling small business owners – pay taxes to help pay for 
the drugs of people who work for the governments that will 
not pay for theirs. Canadians are good at irony.
Vacuums create forces to fill them. In the absence of 
a universal plan to cover an obviously essential service, 
employers got into the healthcare business, their participation 
greased by incentives difficult to refuse. Employer costs are 
tax deductible and hence publicly subsidized. The rest can be 
passed onto consumers in the form of higher prices. Employees 
get subsidized access to drugs, and the employer-sponsored 
benefits are tax-free to individuals. Private insurers are like 
the casinos that employ the dealers and accountants, take the 
house cut, and make shareholders happy. There is the illusion 
of benefits management but no one – not the employee with a 
use it or lose it entitlement; not the employer anxious to retain 
good employees and maintain calm labour relations; not the 
insurer for whom raising premiums is a better option than 
to risk losing clients by playing bad cop – has any incentive 
to promote rigorously evidence-based utilization. The whole 
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scheme is a textbook case of moral hazard. 
Just maybe it is finally pharmacare’s time. Commissioned by 
the federal government, A Prescription for Canada: Achieving 
Pharmacare for All10 (hereinafter the Hoskins Report) makes 
60 recommendations on how to achieve universal drug 
coverage. One can quibble here and there, but the report 
is clear and principled, and acting on all or most of what it 
prescribes would make things better, not least because it 
would be difficult to make them worse. But it is less a blueprint 
than an artist’s rendering, and as a film it edited out some 
graphic scenes and stern language to achieve a G rating. It 
ably describes the train wreck that is the Canadian drug sector 
but is silent on the forensics of why it went off the rails. The 
status quo did not emerge by spontaneous generation. It is the 
product of influence and design, horse trading and political 
calculation, the sacrifice of good government on the altar of 
peace and order. The interests that created and profit by it are 
still in play, entrenched and cunning, and their legions are 
massed on the banks of the Rubicon to defend it. 
Yet for all the rot of current arrangements and the impeccable 
logic of admitting pharmacare to the medicare tent, it is not a 
Nadal-in-the-French Open sure win. Canada’s drug sector is 
a mess because private and particular interests supersede the 
public interest. Current policy and practice make a mockery 
of the principles of medicare (medical necessity, accessibility, 
and comprehensiveness are glaring casualties), favour the 
strong over the weak, the prosperous over the poor, the 
suppliers over the patients. A lot of health and a great deal of 
money are at stake. 
The Hoskins Report vision for pharmacare will not see the 
light of day because it rights wrongs, helps the disadvantaged, 
improves prescribing, or lowers prices - though it would do all 
of the above. It will emerge in recognizable form only through 
brave and artful politics at all levels, and carefully designed 
processes that will translate good intentions into good 
practice. What starts out with hope and promise and inspiring 
language can end up in self-parody. The Chinese Constitution 
declares that all nationalities are equal and commits the state 
to the protection and preservation of human rights.
In the Hoskins Report the words “values” and “fairness” 
appear 10 times each – invariably to salute Canadians’ world 
class commitment to justice – and the word “interests” only 
once, in passing. Like the rest of medicare, pharmacare is 
redistributive, and if sensibly designed it will be anathema to 
those who profit from the prevailing illogic and inefficiency. 
They will energetically protect their interests, either by 
stalling pharmacare in its tracks or chipping away at the 
implementation plan until it no longer resembles the original. 
They are sophisticated, well-connected, and rich. They know 
how to push politicians’ buttons and convince the public 
that no government plan could treat them as well as the 
pharma-private insurance alliance. To succeed, the architects 
of universal pharmacare must produce a clear, brave, and 
sustained counter-narrative. Getting it right is a job for 
vertebrates.
Governments must of course design pharmacare well, 
but successful implementation is in the hands of five major 
political constituencies. First among them are physicians, 
the gatekeepers to prescription drug use and the de facto 
stewards of the approved inventory. Visions of improved 
quality, prudent use, and better value for money will shatter 
into shards of disappointment unless doctors individually 
and collectively work to eliminate inappropriate prescribing, 
accept generics and cost-effective therapeutic equivalents as 
the defaults, and promote responsible and prudent use to 
their patients. They must get their pharmaceutical education 
from independent peer reviewed science and unconflicted 
mentors rather than beguiling drug company promotions. 
They must partner with regulators, professional associations, 
specialty societies, educators, and governments to ensure 
that perfection does not become the enemy of the good, and 
resist the temptation to declare pharmacare a disaster when 
difficult formulary decisions are made, or when efforts are 
made to curb overuse. 
Getting physicians on board will be a challenge, but arguably 
less difficult than navigating the economics and politics of 
retail pharmacy, a business nested within and owned by much 
larger businesses dominated by chains. The pharmacy is not 
the principal enterprise, and it occupies a tiny fraction of the 
floor space in large commercial enterprises that now include 
grocery stores and Walmarts. The interests and culture of the 
larger enterprise invariably infiltrate the pharmacy. 
To work as the Hoskins Report intends, universal pharmacare 
requires a non-commercial, non-profit-maximizing ethos 
that views drugs as public goods rather than free market 
commodities. It relies on pharmacists who are experts on 
drugs but agnostic about their use. Drugs are already the 
most commodified healthcare sector. By paying pharmacists 
for dispensing, governments have abetted a consumerist 
drug culture. The easy money comes from filling a bottle and 
attaching a label, not from questioning dubious prescriptions 
and educating doctors and patients. Any system that rewards 
volume and discourages meaningful professional engagement 
with patients and other healthcare providers is a threat to a 
well-functioning pharmacare. Changing professional culture 
is difficult under any circumstances, but impossible without 
eliminating the perverse incentives embedded in the retail 
drug economy. 
The third constituency is private drug insurance, the 
100 000 private plans pharmacare is designed to replace. 
The sector is an enormously over-populated and inefficient 
house of cards. If it disappears, people will lose their jobs, 
like auto workers replaced by robots and bank tellers by ATM 
machines. Obsolescence is the cruel side effect of progress. If 
we kept every once-useful process or technology in service, 
offices would be alive with the clackety-clack of IBM Selectric 
typewriters.
The Hoskins Report is here it is too deferential, polite to 
the point of self-contradiction. “National pharmacare should 
offer comprehensive and affordable coverage so that no one 
will need supplementary private drug insurance.” Quite so, 
but then: “Nonetheless, individuals should be able to purchase 
private insurance to cover any out of pocket costs associated 
with pharmacare (such as copayments) and for drugs not 
listed on the national formulary.”
It is disingenuous to offer an irrational choice. There is 
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no rational market for insurance to cover the recommended 
copayments of $5 per prescription and $100 annually. So 
the role of private insurance must be to cover drugs not 
listed on the national formulary. If the formulary is well-
constructed by disinterested experts, these excluded drugs 
have failed to meet reasonable standards of efficacy and/or 
cost-effectiveness. If the standards are too high, reasonable 
people will deem coverage inadequate and pharmacare will 
die by a thousand re-emerging private plans. If the standards 
are sound and evidence-based, and if there is the safety valve 
of a separate pool to cover some experimental, high cost, and 
rare condition drugs, what would one buy insurance for? By 
definition, access to drugs unlikely to be effective and/or 
extraordinarily expensive. 
Some excluded drugs will have a (usually tiny) chance of 
working where all others have failed, a final tilt at a daunting 
windmill. It is both foreseeable and understandable that some 
people in some circumstances will want these drugs listed 
on either the regular or special formulary. The contested 
decisions will revolve around drugs that might be helpful, 
but not helpful enough to pay for even from the special cases 
fund. 
No public (or private) plan can fund every drug in every 
circumstance at any cost. An excellent public school system 
does not provide one-on-one tutoring for every special needs 
student. No government builds divided highways to every 
community even though doing so would prevent some harms. 
A well-meaning physician might propose and a patient might 
be willing to try an excluded drug once all other option have 
been exhausted. But it would be sheer folly to design universal 
pharmacare around individuals’ decision criteria in dire 
circumstances.
Regardless, it makes little sense either to offer or buy 
insurance for these anomalous cases. The insurer would have 
to demand high premiums, exclude pre-existing conditions, 
and develop elaborate case-by-case adjudication criteria 
to minimize risk. The buyer would need a lot of disposable 
income, be willing to pay the high costs of insuring against 
very low probability events, and agree to the insurer’s terms 
and conditions. It is difficult to imagine a scenario where 
either the insurer or the buyer is not seriously miscalculating 
expected benefits. Patients would almost always be better off 
self-insuring: simply pay for the drugs out-of-pocket. For very 
expensive drugs, neither option is available to the non-rich 
and those disinclined to chase miracles at great cost, but in the 
grand scheme of things this minor inequity is hardly fatal to 
the fairness of a soundly built public plan.
The report ultimately shrinks from its own diagnosis, 
reluctant to cut down the dying tree looming ominously over 
the roof. Instead it offers private insurance a bone: “They [the 
employers] will have the financial room to offer other health 
benefits to their workers (for example, mental health and 
wellness services, physiotherapy, dental and vision care)…” 
Here is where tactful silence would have been preferable. 
The rationale for universal pharmacare applies equally to 
other services not covered by medicare, such mental health, 
physiotherapy, dental, and vision care. All are medically 
necessary, many go without to their detriment, and in the 
case of dental11 and vision care,12 costs are rising quickly and 
supplier-induced demand (upselling) is common. To enhance 
population health and the comprehensiveness of primary 
care, improving access to mental health services is at least 
as important as universal pharmacare. It makes no sense 
to endorse private, employer-sponsored insurance for the 
gander after explaining why it is inappropriate for the goose. 
Private drug insurance, like coal mines and tobacco 
companies, is the problem to be solved, not a precious legacy 
to be repurposed. There is no point putting it on expensive 
life support once it can no longer survive on its own. Rather 
than flinch and prop up a doomed industry, public policy 
should bid it farewell and support the transition of displaced 
employees to more useful roles. 
The fourth, and most sophisticated and powerful group is 
pharma. Canada now pays among the highest prices in the 
world, and with a fully empowered single negotiator – the 
already-existing Pan-Canadian Pharmaceutical Alliance of 
governments recommended by the Hoskins Report - there is 
a reasonable prospect of saving several billion dollars a year.13 
(Currently its recommendations are non-binding on provinces 
and territories.) There is a precedent: provincial governments 
slashed unconscionably high generic drug prices dramatically 
a few years ago. The more difficult battle will be to keep 
marginal drugs out of the formulary. Canada has excellent 
drug assessment expertise, now nationally coordinated 
through the Canadian Agency for Drugs and Technology in 
Health’s common drug review protocol. Pharma is adept at 
enlisting prominent physicians and patient advocacy groups 
in the permanent campaign to secure coverage of expensive 
drugs with modest health benefits and expand the pool of 
patients for whom use is approved. The pharma war chest 
is effectively unlimited; companies caught red-handed in 
deceitful marketing practices and price-fixing appear to shrug 
off billion-dollar plus fines with equanimity as just another 
cost of doing business.14 
Ideally drug companies would adjust their practices 
to help make pharmacare work, but it is a big ask. Their 
current business model owes much of its success to me-too 
drugs, mischievous litigation to extend the life of patents, 
massive marketing campaigns, excess utilization, and price 
maximization. It is unrealistic to anticipate an industry-wide 
epiphany followed by reinvention. Pharma will cleave to its 
model until it has been shown that the politics can withstand 
the inevitable torrent of misinformation, special pleading, 
and orchestrated outrage against rational decisions and tough 
bargaining. 
Governments should neither deliberately alienate pharma 
nor secure its affections through bad policy. Little New 
Zealand is indifferent to pharma’s wishes and is willing to live 
without a significant R&D presence. If drug-makers threaten 
to shut down their Canadian R&D, currently about a billion 
dollars annually,15 there will be a loss of jobs and perhaps a 
foregone discovery, although I cannot find evidence that 
Canadian research sponsored by multinationals has been 
primarily responsible for a single breakthrough drug in the 
past 50 years. The R&D jobs are clustered in metro Montreal 
and Toronto, obviously important politically. But the loss of 
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pharma R&D dollars need not mean a net loss in total R&D 
spending. 
In a tax-funded pharmacare, costs will shift from businesses 
to government. Universal pharmacare should be cost-neutral 
for business, with the money previously spent on private 
plans harvested as taxes and invested in R&D, evaluation, and 
education based on a public interest model. This would be a 
boon to researchers and a catalyst for quality improvement. 
Successful pharmacare is a scientific, cultural, and behavioural 
transformation that cannot be permanently sustained without 
adequate investment on all three fronts. 
The fifth and most critical constituency is the public. 
Two-thirds of Canadians, largely middle class, are covered 
by private plans, which among other things accounts for the 
muted political pressure to implement a universal plan. While 
the public supports universal coverage, there are concerns 
about a reduction in benefits and choices.16 It is conceivable 
– probably inevitable – that a national formularly will exclude 
some drugs now covered in some private plans. Citizens 
cannot be fair-weather pharmacare supporters, demanding 
prudent stewardship of resources and consumption in all 
cases but their own, or both generous coverage and lower 
taxes. They must be open to the notion that existing plans 
are inefficient and that there are good reasons for a universal 
formulary to exclude drugs to which they currently have 
access. They must stand behind governments that stand up 
to extortionist prices. Allegiance to pharmacare’s principles 
and coverage criteria cannot dissolve at the first appearance 
of heart-tugging individual cases. 
Canada need not settle for an ascetic, minimalist 
pharmacare. It can afford a generous program. The need 
for healthcare in general, and costly drugs in particular, is 
unevenly distributed. Those with conditions for which there is 
no cheap and effective treatment should not be left out in the 
cold by pharmacare. Healthcare is a right and a compassionate 
enterprise that cannot adhere to strict utilitarianism. It will 
cost tens of thousands of dollars a year to treat some and 
$100 a year to treat others, based on need and the state of 
science. Special circumstances warrant special consideration. 
But the greatest good for the greatest number remains the 
ethical foundation of public programs even if it ought not to 
be applied too strictly. Sometimes when the heart says yes the 
head must say no, not for lack of empathy, but because more 
good can be had elsewhere. 
There may well have to be compromises in formulary design 
to acquire and maintain the support of large segments of the 
population attached to their current plans. There will be fewer 
hard choices to make if doctors and pharmacists mobilize to 
promote evidence-based practice and pharmacare harvests 
the dividends of lower prices and prudent use. Billions are now 
wasted on overuse: opioids, benzodiazepines, older people 
on ten or more medications. Some overuse is not just low 
value, but harmful, incurring additional health spending.17,18 
Perhaps a tenth of elderly admissions to hospital result from 
adverse drug reactions.19 The more prudent overall drug use, 
the more money available for new, plausibly effective, but 
very expensive drugs for more people, at the very least on an 
experimental basis to ascertain their true value over time. 
A high-functioning pharmacare plan is what microbiologists 
call a fastidious organism: it needs a specific culture to thrive. 
If the culture is inhospitable, the organism will be disfigured. 
The Affordable Care Act in the United States has extended 
health insurance to some 20 million people, but to get it passed 
the Obama administration made enormous concessions to 
pharma and the private insurance industry, leaving massive 
inefficiencies in place.20 Many of Canadian medicare’s 
shortcomings are traceable to the founding compact with 
physicians that enshrined both independent contractor status, 
and fee-for-service as the dominant payment method. It can 
take a very long time to recover from deals that looked good 
at the time.
Universal pharmacare is a formidable design challenge 
that demands the balance of a gymnast, the patience of a 
kindergarten teacher, the calculating discipline of a poker 
player, and the precise teamwork of a pit crew. Policy-makers, 
doctors, and pharmacists must do their parts to make good on 
its promise. It would be a bonus if pharma changed its ways. 
But much depends on sensible and smart citizens and patients 
committed to prudent use, supportive of sound coverage rules 
fairly applied, accepting of tough calls in tough cases, and 
resistant to seductive marketing and the promise of a quick 
fix. This is as much a civic as a technical challenge, dependent 
on the politics of good policy-making, the balancing of 
interests, and above all a shared commitment to the public 
good. Ask not (only) what pharmacare can do for you; ask 
what you must do for pharmacare to make it a unifying, just, 
and health-enhancing program.
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